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Aristotle on Akratic Action: How Rational is It?
t

Patrick Mooney, John Carroll University (Cleveland, OH)
(SAGP with APA Central Division Meeting, May 8, 1998, Chicago, Illinois)
[N.B.: In order to devote more space to my argument, I have omitted all footnote material, though I
retain the note numbers in the text. Persons interested may obtain the notes from me in Chicago, or upon
request via (216) 397-4786, or, <pmooney@jcvaxa.jcu.edu>. Apologies for any frustration.]

§1. Introduction.
. My answer to the question asked in the paper’s title is: akratic action-acting
contrary to what one believes or knows is the best course of action open to one, or
“weakness of will”—is not rational at all, according to Aristotle (here restricting myself to
his discussion of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics, VII. 1-3). In saying that it is ‘not
rational at all,’ I have in mind that there is no “intellectual,” or “cognitive,” faculty at work
which so much as helps to bring about the akratic act-there is, in other words, no way in
which the akrates “figures out” how to perform the akratic act.
For those readers who believe that Aristotle’s account of akrasia involves two
warring “practical syllogisms” (a view to be discussed shortly), my claim should come as a
bit of a surprise, because what I will call the “two-syllogisms” interpretation of Aristotle is
incompatible with it. According to the two-syllogisms view, Aristotelian akratic action is at
least somewhat rational. Thus, for example, I disagree with the great Burnet, who
maintains that it is “Aristotle’s great contribution to moral psychology” that there is an
intellectual element involved in vice and weakness.1 On my view, Aristotle does not
believe that there is an intellectual element involved in weakness.
Other readers will find a certain aspect of the argument for my view a little
surprising. Since Aristotle partly intended for his account of akrasia to refute Socrates’
rejection of akrasia (as I shall argue in Section 2), since the two- syllogisms account would
surely not have refuted Socrates or the Socratic (as I shall argue in Sections 3 and 4), and
if we allow the amount of interpretive charity appropriate for one as great as Aristotle--so
that we allow that Aristotle would see that such an account (if indeed such an account had
occurred to him to give) would not refute Socrates or the Socratic—then we have good
reason to suppose that Aristotle did not give a two syllogisms account of akrasia. This
argument will surprise because it suggests that Aristotle, unlike most of us modems,
takes Socrates’ rejection of akrasia seriously enough to use it as a philosophical foil in
discussing his own views. In fact, as I will point out below, Aristotle uses Socrates’
position as something of a “test” for the soundness of certain “common beliefs” about
akrasia that he wishes to defend. Aristotle’s attitude towards Socrates’ rejection of akrasia
is thus not as enthusiastically négative as modem ones tend to be, and this insightprovides for us an important interpretive constraint upon our reading of his own positive
account of akrasia, viz., that it should turn out to be philosophically apposite to the
Socratic, and not necessarily to the non-Socratic. (Are we to suppose that there were no
Socratics about akrasia, or, at least, Socratic-leaners, in Aristotle’s student audience?2) So,
in order to see how a crucial portion of Aristotle’s account of akrasia is supposed to work,
we will need to take some Socratic presumptions with us to the text. This, indeed, is an
unusual approach to take in examining issues regarding akrasia in general, as well as an
unusual approach in examining Aristotle’s discussion in particular.
In fact, the vast portion of my paper will be devotedtosettingout-this ArietotelianSocratic exchange on akrasia that I believe lies just below the surface of Aristotle’s
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discussion in the Ethics, and that has gone mostly unnoticed and unexploited in the
previous scholarship on Aristotle’s account of akrasia. (Considerations of space will have
me single-mindedly arguing for that point, to the exclusion of including a discussion of
what I believe is Aristotle’s real account of akrasia.) A posthumous dialogue—so to speak-between Socrates and Aristotle on this topic is rich in resources, I think: If my reason is a
good one for finding dubious what I have called a “two-syllogisms” interpretation of
Aristotelian akrasia, then some strengths of the Socratic psychology of action are revealed
that otherwise remain mostly hidden. Some of these strengths are unlocked upon a more
careful reading of one of Socrates’ near contemporaries—someone, notably, who has
found plenty more favor among modem philosophers than has Socrates.3
Since so much of what I have to say about Aristotle’s account of akrasia depends
upon my view that he uses Socrates’ rejection of akrasia as a test for the correctness of
common beliefs about akrasia that he wishes to defend, I begin by arguing for this claim.
§2: How Aristotle Constructs His Own Discussion of Akrasia Around the Task of Giving
an (Un-Socratic) Answer to Socrates and the Socratic.
There can be little question, I think, that Aristotle’s account of akrasia is, in
considerable part, constructed as a response to Socrates’ infamous denial of the possibility
of akrasia. This can be seen, to begin with, by considering the method of approach that
Aristotle announces he will follow in examining akrasia (1145b3-7), and, secondly, by
considering how his approach imposes upon him the task of having to philosophically
confront Socrates’ rejection of akrasia.
Here is Aristotle’s announced method of approach (I shall rely heavily upon the
Irwin translation of the Ethics, with my very few departures discussed in the notes):
As in the other cases we must set out the appearances (τ à
φαινόμενα), and first of all go through the puzzles. In this way we
must prove the common beliefs (τά ένδοξα) about these ways of
being affected—ideally, all the common beliefs, but if not all, then
most of them, and the most important. For if the objections are
solved, and the common beliefs are left, it w ill be an adequate
proof.4

We must not simply accept the common beliefs about akrasia, I take Aristotle’s overall
point to be, without first subjecting those beliefs to some critical examination. So he will
first say what the common beliefs {ta phainomena or ta endoxaf are about akrasia before
considering some difficulties, or objections, that they encounter; and then, if possible, he
will try to show that all of the common beliefs about it are nevertheless true in spite of
the difficulties. Should the common beliefs hold up under such scrutiny, this will be a
sufficient argument on their behalf.
Per his method of approach, Aristotle then proceeds to list some common beliefs
(1145b8-21). On account of space considerations, I here list only those that I believe are
most relevant for my discussion. These are that.
The enkrates {the one who is “strong of will”} is the same as the one
who abides by his rational calculation, and the akrates is the same
as the one who {steps outside of}6 it,

and that,
The akrates knows that his actions are base, but does them because
of his feelings, while the enkrates knows that his appetites are base,
but because of reason does not follow them.

If Aristotle is to defend these beliefs (amongst others) against objections, then he may
need to show how it is possible for a person to “step outside of” his or her rational
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calculation (presumably, a calculation about what’s best for the person to do right now-if
not, then this cannot be a common belief about akrasia) and yet, because of his or her
feelings, act contrary to what has been calculated.
But is knowledge a state against which one may act? A negative answer to this
question seems to He in the offing, and we thus have the first difficulty raised against the
common beliefs. If knowledge is strong, after all, then the common beliefs about akrasia-at least those which maintain that knowledge is weak in such circumstances-must be
incorrect.
Now Aristotle introduces the difficulty saying (1145b21-22): “We might be puzzled
about the sort of correct supposition someone has when he acts akratically,” and, as will
be seen, subsequently cites reasons against there being any such sort of correct
supposition. But it is chiefly Aristotle’s concern with Socrates’ rejection of akrasia that
leads to this difficulty, or aporia. Here is what Aristotle then immediately says about
Socrates and his denial of akrasia (1145b22-27):
F irst of all some say {the akrates} cannot have knowledge [at the
time he acts]. For it would be terrible, Socrates thought, for
knowledge to be in someone, but mastered by something else, and
b24 dragged around like a slave. For Socrates fought against the
account [of akrasia] in general, in the belief th at there is no
b26 akrasia; for no one, he thought, supposes while he acts that his
action conflicts with what is best; our action conflicts with what is
best only because we are ignorant [of the conflict].
If Socrates is right, then, surely, the person cannot, per the first common belief that I
have fisted, step outside of his or her rational calculation about what’s best, nor can he or
she act on feeling rather than on knowledge, per the second common belief.
At b24 Aristotle evidently quotes from the Protagoras, noting Socrates’ denial there
that knowledge can be dragged around by pleasure like a slave. ^ But why does Socrates
deny this? Aristotle answers this question in the following way (beginning at b26):
because Socrates also thinks that the person believes that the action he is performing, as
he performs it, is the best action to perform. In other words, Socrates’ view, according to
Aristotle, is that, since no one acts against what he or she believes is best for him or her at
the time of acting, and since knowledge is a species of belief, neither can one act against
what one knows is best for him or her at the time of acting. Knowledge is strong because
belief is strong. This account of Socrates’ view^ implies that, in discussing akrasia, we
must be quite indifferent about what the sort of correct supposition is that is acted against;
for purposes of getting clear about akrasia, according to Aristotle, knowledge is no better
than true belief (1145b35-46a4; 46b25-31).9 So as Aristotle evidently sees things, the
main issue of akrasia--at least as far as dealing with Socrates’ rejection of akrasia is
concemed-is whether or not one can act against a strong conviction that one has abouti
what’s best for one-never mind what sort of conviction this might happen to be. At the
very' least, we might imagine Aristotle saying to himself, Socrates’ argument about the
strength of knowledge captures this point, for (as Aristotle represents that view) it is
based upon the notion that belief is strong.
It follows that if Socrates is right about knowledge, he’s just as right about true
belief. It may be added that Socrates is then also just as right about phronesis, that
intellectual virtue which Aristotle identifies with the ethically virtuous person since it,
too, involves having correct beliefs about what is best to do in one’s present circumstance
(1140b4-5,11-16).10
Knowledge, strongly held true belief and phronesis are the three sorts of correct
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supposition that Aristotle considers as candidates for being the sort that is acted against
during akrasia; all three of them are found wanting; the first two are found wanting
because of Socrates’ rejection of akrasia·, and the third may be added as wanting in this
regard because of the way in which Aristotle explains Socrates’ argument against akrasia.
It seems, then, that Aristotle must have supposed th at one good test for the
viability of the common beliefs is whether or not they manage to stand up against
Socrates’ view about the strength of knowledge (as Aristotle understands that view).
Remember: The common beliefs are to be defended against various puzzles about them,
and Socrates’ rejection of akrasia is evidently the source of the first puzzle. So even if
Aristotle thinks Socrates is wrong about akrasia, he evidently does not think that Socrates
is obviously wrong about it. (Why bother, after all, with defending the common beliefs
against a difficulty inspired by a view that is obviously wrong?) From Aristotle’s point of
view, Socrates’ view is something of a kingpin: at least some of the common beliefs stand
or fall depending upon it, and Aristotle must have thought it one of his tasks in VII.2-3 of
the Ethics to defend at least some of the common beliefs against Socrates’ denial of
akrasia. If acting contrary to a strong conviction about what’s best is going to be at all
possible, Socrates will need to be wrong about the strength of knowledge.
I shall now assume th at sufficient ground has been given for saying that one of
Aristotle’s main aims in the Ethics, VII.2-3, is to answer Socrates’ rejection of akrasia with
some anti-Socratic account of akrasia. The importance of this line of reasoning, if it is
correct, is that we will have thus established a very important interpretive constraint
upon Aristotle’s own account of akrasia, namely, that,
Aristotle's own account of akrasia w ill need to somehow show,
against the Soeratie position, how akrasia can occur in spite of the
presence of knowledge (or some strongly held conviction) in the
akrates.

I emphasize ‘against the Soeratie position’ in order to underscore the following
point. If Aristotle’s subsequent positive account of akrasia does not somehow resolve the
Soeratie aporia, then Aristotle will not (or, at least, will not necessarily) succeed in his
announced aim. It stands to reason, then, that the Soeratie position on the matter should
be consulted to see if, indeed, Aristotle has succeeded. Aristotle does not, after all,
mention Socrates’ denial of akrasia merely in order to catalogue what has been said on
the issue by those who have considered it before him -a common enough practice for
Aristotle. Instead, as we have seen, he presents it as a difficulty that must somehow be
overcome in order to defend the common beliefs. This means that Aristotle regarded
Socrates’ position as a serious and plausible one-enough so, anyway, to merit a good deal
of his attention in his own discussion.11 Hence, unlike many modem thinkers, Aristotle
does not simply declare Socrates wrong12 and move on to consider other, “more
challenging,” aporiai.
It seems to me, therefore, that if we subsequently find Aristotle’s own account
unconvincing from a Soeratie point of view, then by the “principle” of interpretive charity
we owe it to Aristotle to strongly reconsider our interpretation of him!
How, then, are we to interpret Aristotle in light of these considerations? To begin
with, we may not approach Aristotle’s own account of akrasia armed with our modem
assurance that Socrates is obviously wrong about akrasia, and hope to understand the
account. If our own anti-Socratic confidence is not matched by Aristotle, how can we be so
sure that we will know how to approach Aristotle’s own account of akrasia—that we will
know “what to look for,” so to speak? We will do far better by Aristotle, I think, if we
interpret him in a way that allows him the best chance of satisfying his announced aim of
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defending the common beliefs against objections, and we can do this only if we first give
due consideration to what sort of account of akrasia would pose the greatest challenge to
the Socratic. As will be seen, I believe that such an account must be dismissive of a “twosyllogisms” interpretation of Aristotle.
The best way to introduce the relevant passages on Aristotelian akrasia, why I
believe that Aristotelian akratic action is not rational at all (and so why it in fact poses a
greater philosophical challenge to Socrates than does a two-syllogisms interpretation)
and how my view differs from that of many other scholars, is by briefly considering two
well-known passages from Euripides’ Medea (1041-1066, and 1078-1080). I turn now to
this task.
§3: Is Medea Akratic or Merely Indecisive? Why We Should he Skeptical About a Rather
Common Construal o f Aristotle’s Account of Akrasia.
In considering the Medea passages, I shall assume without argument-though not
without warrant--that Medea is egoistically motivated (i.e., she wants to do whatever is
best for herself in her present circumstance), and that, for her, goodness is a m atter of
pleasure and the absence of pain (where pleasure and pain are broadly construed to
include psychological well-being, or happiness, and ill-being, or misery).
Abandoned by her husband, Jason, Medea decides to exact revenge by murdering
her own children by him. But when the time comes for her to act (the first passage), she
reconsiders her plan. For she sees that by killing the children she will suffer twice as
much pain as will Jason (1047). This is too high a price for revenge, and makes it
anything but sweet. But by not killing them, she will be laughed at (1050). After all, she
betrayed her own family to be with Jason (in fact she killed her own brother), only to
now be betrayed by him in turn—a reversal of fortune that would surely be difficult to
live with. But no one will be laughing at her if she gets away with making Jason pay
dearly for his betrayal: his children must be killed. On the other hand, if she spares the
children and simply brings them to Athens with her (as King Aegeus has promised her
refuge), they will be a source of cheer to her (1058). What will bring her cheer once the
children are gone? Perhaps it is best to spare them, instead. But then (or so I interpret
this particular part of the passage) she realizes that the children have already helped her-unwittingly-to carry out her plot to murder Jason’s new bride, and that they will be
killed by her enemies before they can get away (1060-1). It is best that she kill the
children: They shall die either way, and this way at least their murders may serve to exact
revenge.13
There is so far little question that Medea’s state of mind is one of indecisiveness.
She is, after all, unsure about which of her alternatives will yield the best result for
herself. Can she live more happily (or less miserably) having killed her own children and
making Jason suffer, or by sparing the children and letting Jason get away with his
betraying her? She tries to resolve the matter by turning the alternatives over in her
mind to get a glimpse of the various pluses and minuses that accompany each, but,
changing her mind four times, it is evidently a difficult call for her to make.
When Medea finally comes to commit the deed, however, Euripides presents her as
being in an “akratic” condition (the second passage). Here is what Euripides has Medea
say (1078-1080):
I know (μανθάνω) indeed what evil (κακόν) I intend to do,
But stronger than all my afterthoughts (ßo-u>^e4^at a> is my
fury (θυμός),
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Fury that brings upon mortals the greatest evils (κακόν).!4

The point that I wish to make about these two passages is that, when taken
together, they reveal a philosophical complication which is deserving of more attention
than it typically receives. The complication I have in mind is not so easily seen when it
occurs in the context of a philosophical work of the complexity and richness of Aristotle’s
Ethics. On the other hand, it is relatively easy to see in the Medea, and it is largely for this
reason that I include the Medea passages in my discussion (besides their providing a
wonderfully convenient way in which to help explain the Socratic view to which I take
Aristotle to be responding). I elucidate the complication from the Medea in the following
paragraphs before showing how it shows up in the Ethics.
If Medea’s changes of mind in the earlier passage (a mere dozen lines prior to the
later passage) are really only reconsiderations (or even recalculations) of the advantages
and disadvantages to come from the alternatives of killing the children and not killing the
children, then we have ready to hand a perfectly good explanation for why she ultimately
kills them, namely, that she miscalculates, or misjudges, or wrongly estimates (or
commits some other sort of intellectual error), that this action is better for her overall
than is the action of not killing them. She chooses the wrong alternative, after all, and
the first passage leads us to believe that what will determine her choice is simply what
results from a comparison o f the relative advantages and disadvantages o f each
alternative. From the point of view of the first passage, and not anticipating the second,
how else can she have failed to choose correctly but for her simply not knowing which
alternative is the best one (though indeed she takes that course of action which, in the
end, seems best to her)? According to the “akratic” explanation offered in the second
passage, on the other hand, Medea is indeed not ignorant of what is best, for she knows
which alternative this is, namely, not killing the children. Moreover, we are told in this
passage, it is her fuxy (thumos) which gets her to act in spite of her knowing which of the
two alternatives yields a better outcome.15 According to this explanation, there is no
thoroughness or precision of calculation concerning the relative advantages and
disadvantages of the alternatives, that will have been sufficient to prevent her from
killing the children.
Most readers will recognize that the explanation of Medea’s action inspired by the
first passage recalls Socrates’ denial that akrasia ever occurs. According to Socrates,
knowledge cannot be overcome by passion or pleasure (Protagoras, 352b-357b), so if one
knows which of one’s available alternatives is the best course of action to take, then one
must act accordingly, unless otherwise prevented from so acting. All wrong action (that
is, any action which yields less good or greater harm to the person than does some
available alternative that was open to the person at the time of acting) is to be explained
by the person’s Ignorance, or false belief; of what action from among· the alternatives was
in fact best for him or her in that circumstance.16 I shall henceforward refer to this sort of
explanation of wrong action as the “Socratic explanation.” According to this explanation
of her action, Medea kills the children because she (wrongly) believes that this action is
better for herself overall than the alternative; and wanting to do whatever’s best for
herself given her circumstance, she acts according to this (false) belief.
I come now to the complication that have I mentioned. The person who demands
some measure of philosophical acumen from his or her fiction should expect, having now
read the first passage, that the explanation for why Medea kills the children is that she
simply misjudges that the alternative of not killing the children xsl less beneficial for
herself overall. (So we might imagine a Socratically inspired Euripides having Medea
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come to the terrible realization-after having acted-that she indeed misjudged the relative
merits of her action. This certainly seems tragic enough.) But one should then find the
appearance of the second, akrasia, passage a little puzzling because it is now superfluous:
We simply do not need to appeal to akrasia in order to explain her action. In fact, the
akratic explanation is plainly inconsistent with the Socratic one: if the state of her mind as
she kills the children is one of ignorance or false belief about what’s best, she simply
cannot be acting akratically. How, then, are we to come to grips with Medea’s action? Is
she merely indecisive (unsure about what’s best for her to do in her circumstance), or
akratic (knows what’s best, has that option open to her to perform, but does not do it)?
. My purpose in setting out these considerations-far from being an attem pt to
examine Euripides’ own account of human action (as though his chief concern in the
Medea was to present such an account)-is to focus attention upon the juxtaposition of the
Socratic and akratic accounts of human action that his literary example provides.
What I shall now maintain is that, provided that we accept a rather common
construal of the text, we meet with the same sort of awkward juxtaposition in a rather
unexpected place, namely, in Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia in the Nicomackean Ethics
(VH.3,1147a31-35)! This is an unexpected place to find the juxtaposition, if I am right to
say that it is there, quite aside from the consideration that this is now Aristotle we are
talking about and not Euripides. (Although Euripides is very probably not interested in
providing a coherent account of some wrong actions in the Medea, Aristotle surely is in
VII.3 of the Ethics; and whatever his philosophical merits may have been, if any,
Euripides was no Aristotle.) The real surprise is that, because Aristotle is partly
concerned, as we have seen, to answer Socrates’ rejection of akrasia with a positive
account of akrasia, he should have been particularly wary to avoid a juxtaposition of
explanations similar to that found in the Medeal For then, much like Euripides, Aristotle
will have superfluously juxtaposed an akratic account of wrong action with an
explanation of wrong action that is perfectly Socratic-Socratic, that is, in the sense that
the wrong action may be explained quite satisfactorily as being solely the result of a (mis-)
calculation about what’s best for the person in the present circumstance. If I am right
about this, then the Socratic may him or her self reply to Aristotle’s apparent account of
akrasia by simply redescribing Aristotelian so-called-akratic action in terms of false belief
or ignorance. That is, just as Socrates might have said to his contemporary Euripides:
“Well, Medea may believe that she is behaving akratically (at 107880), but as her indecisiveness in the first passage shows, she has
really only—tragically-m iscalculated. This is all the explanation
that is really needed for her action, and your including this first
passage in your play only shows that you yourself are tempted by
my own view that all of our actions are preceded by a consideration
o f th eir relative merits" and dem erits—by a consideration of how
good or bad they w ill turn out to be for us—and that all of our
actions are brought about solely by such rational consideration.
Your addition of the akrasia passage is then really only ad hoc and
unnecessary,”

the Socratic might likewise respond to Aristotle’s account of akrasia:
Aristotle is unable to refute Socrates’ denial of akrasia so long as
his own positive account of akrasia has the akrates rationally
calculating about the m erits and demerits of his or her wrong
action. For then, we may justifiably press A ristotle for an
explanation of how, or why, the wrong action must result from
akrasia rather than ignorance. In fact, the Socratic may w ell press
A ristotle for an explanation of what, precisely, the difference
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between ignorance and akrasia is really supposed to be. (Is this
one more instance in which "being overcome by pleasure” turns out
to be nothing other than ignorance? [Prig. 357c-d.]

As I shall argue below, the only sure way for Aristotle to effectively respond to
Socrates’ denial of akrasia is by somehow or other blocking any redescription of the
wrong-doer’s action in Socratically rational terms. What I will call a “Euripidean
juxtaposition” of explanations, though, does not allow him to do this. If I am right, then
not only does Aristotle fail to refute Socrates’ seemingly outrageous denial of akrasia (a
shocking enough result, I should think, from the point of view of many contemporary
philosophical views about wrong action according to which Socrates is obviously wrong),
but one is also then tempted to say that Aristotle “should have known better” how not to
argue against his own near-contemporary. Neither consequence speaks well of Aristotle’s
philosophical efforts in VII.1-3 of the Ethics.
This, as I say, is what happens if what I have said is a common construal of
Aristotle is correct. But what I shall argue for in the remainder of this paper is that this
common construal is incorrect, and that, from Aristotle’s point of view, he has blocked any
chance for a Socratic rational redescription of the wrong-doer’s action.17 The reason I
think that, from his point of view, Aristotle has blocked the redescription of the wrong
doer’s action, is because Aristotelian akratic action is not rational at all. It is not the
result of any sort of intellectual calculation about what to do, nor about how to do it. This
is the main thesis that I plan to elucidate and to defend.
But how, precisely, does the alleged Euripidean juxtaposition of explanations show
up in the VII.3 passage (1147a31-35, reproduced below) in the first place? And even if it
does, how, precisely, does its presence allow Socrates to “redescribe” what Aristotle wants
to be akratic action as being an action done merely from ignorance or false belief? I shall
begin to answer the first question in the remainder of the present section, reserving for
the sequel my answer to the second question and the conclusion of my answer to the first.
How, then, does the alleged Euripidean juxtaposition of explanations show up in
the Ethics passage? My answer here will require that I first introduce what has become
something of a technical term in Aristotelian scholarship, namely, the “practical
syllogism”—not Aristotle’s own term. Considerations of space will not permit a more full
discussion of this controversial subject than what I provide below.
According to the construal of Aristotle that I am contrasting with my own position,
we are to suppose that the Aristotelian akrates possesses two practical syllogisms at the
time that he or she behaves akratically, each of the syllogisms recommending to the
akrates two distinct courses of action, namely, to avoid the bad action and to pursue the
bad action. The practical syllogism seems to be Aristotle’s w ay-at least sometimes--of
representing a.person’s thinking about what to do in a particular circumstance and,then,
acting-m ore specifically, of a person’s going from a somewhat general belief (or
“universal” belief, or premise) about what to do, to doing a quite particular action- The
person does this by way of “combining” (1147a26-7) this universal belief with a particular
belief (DA, III.11.434al7-19, EN, VII.3.1147ae, 4, 25; 1147bl3, 15). For example: If John
Dough has the universal belief that Everything sweet must be tasted (1147a29-31),
practical syllogistic gets him to actually taste the particular (sweet) fresh pastry which sits
before him by his combining the universal belief that Everything sweet must be tasted
with the particular belief that This [the particular pastry] is sweet. Unless otherwise
prevented CEN,1147a31; cf., DMA, 1SIOlal 5-16). the combination .of the two behefs results
in a conclusion which is itself an action (DMA, 701al3,20,23; hence, a practical syllogism,
as opposed to a “syllogism of reason,” DMA, 701a7-13; EN, 1147a25-28).18
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Now how does the person go from the universal belief to performing the action?
The answer th at is suggested by the sweetness example (see also the examples
mentioned in note 17), it seems to me, is that the person comes to “substitute,” as it were,
the particular object mentioned in the particular belief (a particular pastry, say) for the
sort of object that is mentioned in the universal belief, so that what the person thinks
about the sort of object (of sweets, that they must be tasted), he or she now also comes to
think about the quite particular object (of this [fresh pastry], that it must be tasted), and
this substitution results in the action (e.g., the action of tasting the fresh pastiy). In sum,
the person has the belief that, 1. Everything sw eet must be tasted, and the belief that,
2. This [pastry] is sweet. By substituting the term ‘this’ (the particular pastry) in (2)
for the term ‘everything sweet’ in (1), the person comes to eat the fresh pastry sitting
before him or her, since, after all, he now also believes that, This must be tasted.
' Now my elucidating the practical syllogism in terms of such a rational
“substitution” is justified by Aristotle’s own mention of the “combination” of universal and
particular beliefs (1147a26-7) which he maintains causes (at least some) action. Action
occurs, he says, when “όταν δέ μία γένηται έξ αύτων,” or, ‘when one [belief] comes from
these [universal and particular beliefs].’ I fail to see what sense Aristotle’s remark could
have in the present context (comparing, as he does, the practical syllogism with the
“theoretical” Syllogism, where substitution must take place) if not his making some point
about what I have called “substitution” in the above illustration.
Moreover, it seems to me, such a combination of beliefs will also demand of Dough
(just as it does of Medea) that he “calculate,” in some sense, about the merits and demerits
of the particular alternatives before him -in other words, th a t he intellectually
discriminate between pastry, pastiy box, pastry tissue, etc. This may strike some readers
as remarkably counterintuitive, for it may seem that we know the identity of such things
“automatically,” as it were. For the time being, my answer here is simply to underscore
that the aim of what I have called “substitution” is to produce an action that satisfies an
only somewhat general desire, for the aim of the present syllogism is to produce an action
that is sweet-pursuing. But without discriminating between his various altem ativeswithout checking for, hypothesizing about or guessing at (and the like) the proposed
object’s suitability for being acted upon given the parameters specified in the universal
belief-how can this aim be met? To say that This is sweet is, for purposes of the
syllogism, to “rank” this ahead of other things for its relevance to the universal belief
(1112al7-19) and to do that will require some discriminatory ability. Eating the box in
which the pastries sit, after all, will hardly do to satisfy the appetite for sweet; making for
a sweet demands a “surgically” precise mechanism of object selection. My overall point
here is that rational substitution requires rational discrimination.
So whenever Dough satisfies a desire by, in part, the use of practical syllogistic* his
rational faculty must determine how to act to satisfy the desire. He must combine beliefs
about objects and actions that are of differing degrees of specificity, and for that purpose,
some objects and actions will do, others will not, and some will do better than others.
Importantly, I think, Aristotle’s remark about combination immediately precedes
his “Everything sweet must be tasted” example, which itself immediately precedes the
passage which I claim contains the alleged Euripidean juxtaposition of Socratic and
akratic explanations. Quite evidently, then, whatever else may be true about it, “practical
syllogistic” will play some role in Aristotle’s account of akrasia, and so, no less, will the
notion of combination. Furthermorersmce the sort of substitutionB-oBseombanation-and^
discrimination that I have been discussing is a rational principle (or principles), and
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provided that my account of Aristotelian practical syllogistic has not been in error, then I
conclude that Aristotle’s explanation of akrasia at 1147a31-35 must include the akrates’
use of this rational principle.
For the time being, then, so much for the practical syllogism. Here, now, is what
Aristotle says at EN, 1147a31-35, the passage which I claim includes an Euripidean
juxtaposition of explanations, if interpreted as mentioning two practical syllogisms:
« Suppose, then, that someone has (a) the universal belief, and it
hinders him from tasting; he has (b) the second belief, that
__
everything sweet is pleasant and this is sweet, and this belief (b) is
32-3 active; and he also has appetite {epithumia}. Hence, the belief (c)
itells him to avoid this, but appetite leads him on, since it is capable
34-5 Iof moving each of the [bodily] parts.

Now there is a certain vagueness in this passage which might easily lead one to
believe th a t there are mentioned not one, but two, practical syllogisms, each
recommending a quite distinct, and contrary, action. In lines 31-2, Aristotle clearly refers
to there being a universal belief which recommends against tasting; and in lines 32-3,
there seems to be mention of another universal belief —that Everything sweet is pleasant-a belief which, from the point of view of appetite, can only be a recommendation to taste
something sweet. Once it is assumed that there is but one universal belief per practical
syllogism,19and once it is seen that the two universal statements have contrary aims, then
what seems to emerge from the passage is that there are indeed two practical syllogisms
being mentioned. The first says something like this (the phrase in brackets indicates the
action that is taken, or is to be taken):
The Good Syllogism
Nothing sweet is to be tasted.20
This is sweet.
[Avoid this.]
The second says something like this:
The Syllogism of Appetite
Everything sweet is pleasant (and so is to be tasted).21
This is sweet.
[Taste this.]
We then have the remark at lines 34-5 th at it is appetite (επιθυμία) which moves the
akrates to act wrongly. Thus we have some very strong textual evidence that appetite
gets the person to act upon some particular object via its own practical syllogism, the
Syllogism of Appetite, and that it does so contrary to the recommendation of the Good
Syllogism.
Aristotelian akrasia, then, seems to occur in something like the following way? The
akrates knows what’s best for him or her to do at the time of acting, having determined
this (presumably among other considerations) through combining a universal belief with
a particular belief, a belief about a quite particular object (or about an action, or the
person’s self*2). Presumably, too, the person has a desire to act upon what is known to be
best (βούλησις, or ‘wish’). The akrates therefore knows to avoid this thing (the fresh
pastry), but he or she also has appetite (epithumia), and this desire gets him or her to
make for the sweet thing in spite of what is known to be best. (Presumably, appetite does
this when it is in some sense stronger than is the desire to do what is known to be best.
Moreover, appetite alights upon the sweet thing (the particular pastry) via its own
practical Syllogism, a mechanism which enables appetite to*pick out the* sweet thing, as,
something that it would be pleasant to eat.

I do not say th at all who think that Aristotle’s account involves two practical
syllogisms will agree with me as to each of the details of the picture that I have sketched
here. I say only that it is somewhat common to find interpretations of Aristotle which
have him explaining akrasia in part by reference to two practical syllogisms.23
But now if, as I have argued above, the practical syllogism is a rational mechanism
of action selection, involving, as it does, substitution of terms in an effort to combine two
beliefs into one for the purpose of action, as well as a discrimination between alternative
courses of action for determining what object and action is suitable for such a
combination, then, I maintain, we have a situation much like Medea’s from the first
passage. For then the akrates must be rationally calculative about the particular fresh
pastry in such a way that strongly suggests that his or her two-syllogistic state of soul is in
fact a state of indecision. On the one hand. Dough realizes (as is evidenced by the Good
Syllogism), that the pastry is unhealthy for him (or carries some other disadvantage)-a
reason against eating; on the other hand, he also realizes (as is evidenced by the Syllogism
of Appetite) that it is pleasant tasting-a reason for eating. Each of these conclusions is
reached via the same rational faculty, and so we have no good reason so far to suppose
that his eventual consumption of the pastry may be attributed to akrasia, for-again, so
far—we only have reason to attribute it to his indecisiveness regarding the pastry. “Is the
experience of the pleasant taste worth the sacrifice to my health,” Dough might ask
himself, “Or is the retention of health worth passing on the pastry?” Isn’t this state one of
trying to determine what action will be best for Dough overall? But it will be recalled
that, at least according to the two-syllogisms construal of Aristotle, the presence of each
of these syllogisms in the akrates1 soul is supposed to play a central role in his
explanation of akratic action ! If so, then it seems to me that we have a Euripidean
juxtaposition of explanations in the Ethics.
As I have cautioned earlier, the above discussion is only the beginning of my
answer to the question, “How, precisely, does the Euripidean juxtaposition of explanations
show up in the Ethics.” Without doubt, many readers will be somewhat dissatisfied with
what I have said on this score so far. Among other things, it may be thought, there is a big
difference between the sort of “indecision” experienced by Dough and that experienced by
Medea. To begin with, Medea’s calculations (if that’s what they are) involve a far more
sophisticated deliberation than does Dough’s rational determination (if that’s what it is)
that this is a pastry, and his fairly uncomplicated combination of universal and particular
beliefs. In fact, my presentation of the practical syllogism—even if my admitted lack of
thoroughness about it is allowed to pass-seems rather suspect on at least this one crucial
point, viz., on the m atter of whether or not the person actually intellectually
discriminates between various objects in order to select the one that the person believes
is compatible with the universal belief. It may seem far too implausible to suppose that
Dough actually has to think to himself that this is the pastry (and not that, the pastry
box)," before eating it. To the contrary, it seems that no sort of rational discrimination is
needed for such matters. Even if Dough needs to use some sort of reasoning to decide that
he wanted pastries, as well as for figuring out how to go to the store to get them (and the
like), when it comes down to actually picking up the pastry for eating, such an action is
much more “automatic” and non-intellectual.
Besides, as the two-syllogisms account will have it. Dough’s distinct conclusions
regarding the pastry are apparently “managed” by two distinct desires, one a desire for
the good (assuming here that the Good Syllogism’s universal premise is influenced; say, ~
by a concern for health because health is a good thing for the one who is healthy), and the
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other a desire for what’s merely bodily pleasant (regardless of whether or not the bodily
pleasant is good). While it may have seemed that Medea’s contrary concerns had some
prospect of being reconciled with one another (so th at she can, in principle, make a
rational decision about which alternative is the best for her overall), perhaps Dough’s
contrary concerns are not reconcilable with one another—perhaps, that is, the two goods
under consideration-the “real” good, and the bodily pleasant—are incommensurable
goods, and so there is no prospect of their being reconciled with one another in any
rational way.
Each of these ways in which Dough’s and Medea’s indecisiveness differ, it might be
objected, renders my attempted comparison between them a doomed project. And come
what may for the imagined Socratic response to Euripides, the analogy need not apply to
Aristotle’s use of two syllogisms to explain akrasia.
I plan to answer these concerns, as well as some related ones, in the following
section, where my primary task will be to answer the other main question mentioned
earlier, viz., ‘How, precisely, does the presence of an (alleged) Euripidean juxtaposition of
explanations in the Ethics allow Socrates to redescribe what Aristotle wants to be akratic
action as being an action done merely from ignorance or false belief?’.
§4. A Socratic Response to the Alleged Two-Syllogisms Explanation of Akrasia.
I have said that by attributing to Aristotle the view that the akrates possesses two
contrary practical syllogisms, we are attributing to him an account of akrasia which fails
to close off the Socratic redescription of “akrasia” as being merely a state of ignorance.
The reason th at this is so is because, if the two-syllogisms construal really is part of
Aristotle’s account of akrasia then, as I see it, the Socratic may respond as follows.
(1) The means by which the person carries out an Aristotelian
practical syllogism is the very same means by which the person
carries out Socratic rational calculation about w hafs best to do in
the present circumstance, namely, by intellectually deciding what
particular action w ill best satisfy the desire that the person has
(i.e., by “substitution” and discriminating between alternatives).24

So,
(2) The Aristotelian akrates, who acts according to a “syllogism of
appetite,” must intellectually decide what particular action w ill
best satisfy the appetite (to go ahead and eat this [pointing] sweet
thing, it being the sort of thing that satisfies the desire for
something sweet to taste). That is, the person must nevertheless
intellectually “screen” the proposed (wrong) action in terms o f its
relative advantage to the person’s appetite.

The Socratic may then make the following breathtaking, if suspicious-looking, move:
(3) Therefore, if, in addition to the good syllogism, there is also the
syllogism of appetite, then, when the Aristotelian akrates acts he or
she is acting from a (false) belief about what is best overall for him
or her in the present circumstance!

So-provided that (3) is allowed-the Socratic may also insist that, therefore,
(4) The explanation for the Aristotelian “akrates’ ” wrong action is a
false belief (ignorance) the person has about the goodness to be
gotten by eating sweets.

If (4), then Aristotle has not refuted Socrates because the action may be redescribed in
intellectualist terms. Thus we have it that, from the Socratic point of view, the
Aristotelian “akrates’ ” action seems to be the result of a rational thought process, and
that, as Socrates would have it, therefore his or her action is to be explained by reference
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to a miscalculation, or misjudgement or other sort of intellectual error regarding the
proposed action’s overall goodness; and we see why the Socratic might say that Aristotle
simply does not need to appeal to an irrational desire (epithumia) in order to explain the
wrong action any more than fury (thumos) is needed to explain Medea’s wrong action.
But as my discussion above suggests, (3) seems to be a questionable move. In fact,
(3) may seem to be a very sloppy piece of thinking on the part of the Socratic, for it simply
does not follow from the fact that the person is reasoning about how to best satisfy his or
her desire for something that is bodily pleasant that he or she is therefore reasoning
about how to best satisfy his or her desire for whatever*s best for him or her in the present
circumstance. For what it is that one desires in the one case (what’s best) is not (except
fortuitously) the same thing as what it is that one desires in the other case (what’s merely
bodily pleasant). Quite simply, it may be pleasant to eat sweets, but, generally speaking,
sweets are not good for a person. Hence, to reason about how to satisfy the one desire is
not (except fortuitously) to reason about how to satisfy the other desire. The Socratic may
not maintain that, because the akrates* action is the result of some rational thought
process, therefore the wrong action is to be explained by reference to some intellectual
miscalculation. So the Socratic will be quite wrong to maintain (in [4]) that the person is
acting upon a false belief about what’s best overall for him or her to do, for that person
may be a genuine akrates. The Aristotelian akrates, in that case, has a true belief about
what’s best for him or her right now (but does not act upon that belief), but instead acts
upon a belief about what’s merely bodily pleasant-and, in fact, this belief might also be a
true belief.
My answer to this objection is as follows. The objection’s force, I think, derives
from the assumption that,
(5)
The person doesn’t need to be desiring the good in order to use
his or her rational faculty to act upon the desire that he or she has
since he or she could be knowingly desiring some other thing.25
This assumption is what allows the objector to grant what I have said about Aristotelian
practical syllogistic (that it involves substitution and discrimination), but think very little
of the concession: granting that even appetite needs to do some amount of reasoning in
order to figure out what particular thing to act upon is not damaging to a two-syllogisms
interpretation of Aristotle, because the reasoning that goes on here is simply reasoning
about how to satisfy what appetite wants, and that is not (except fortuitously) reasoning
about whats best.
My strategy for answering the objection to (3) will be to disarm the force of the
assumption (5). And I will do this by arguing that, since Socrates does not himself make
the assumption (5), and since, as I have already argued, Aristotle’s account of akrasia in
the Ethics, is designed, in considerable, part, to answer Socrates’ rejection of akrasia,
Aristotle himself cannot accept (5) as an assumption, but must make some sort of
argument on its behalf. . . if, indeed, he wishes to rely upon (5) at all. However, since I
expect that Aristotle would find arguing for (5), against the Socratic, an extremely difficult
task (and perhaps even contrary to some of his own views about rational desire for the
good), he himself would not argue for (5)!26 To see why this is so, it will be necessary to
consider some aspects of the Socratic psychology of action in some detail.
While Socrates’ view is typically regarded with easy-going skepticism, and while it
may be tempting for some to say of Medea, “How could she not know that it’s wrong to kill
the children?”27 his view nevertheless suggests a rather elegant way of relating thought,
desire and action with one another that cannot be matched by the akratic explanation.
According to this suggestion, all human action is rational action in the sense of its being
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the direct result of an intellectual calculation about what’s best for the person to do in his
or her present circumstance—that is, all human action is the result of a rational desire. In
what follows I elaborate on this point.
A Socratic explanation of action draws together thought and desire by maintaining
the following:
(6) All action results from the comparative strength o f the desire to
perform that action over the strength o f the desire to perform an
alternative action.*8
(7) The strength of a desire is directly related to the degree of good
(pleasure) or bad (pain) that the person expects to come from the
action: the greater is the degree of good, or the lesser is the degree
of bad, expected to come from the action, the stronger is the desire
to perform that action.29
(8) The expectation of goodness upon which a person acts is formed
solely by his or her intellectual calculations about the relative
pleasures and pains to come from the action, i.e., all expectation of
goodness is rational expectation.30

So we get that,
(9) The person always acts on that alternative which he or she
rationally expects will bring the most good.

Propositions (6-9) all lie behind the Socratic position that all action proceeds from a
rational desire, or a desire for what’s best for the person in the present circumstance.31 If
the person’s conception of a proposed action changes in light of new information or fresh
considerations (e.g., Medea now believes that getting revenge against Jason leads to her
own misery, or she now believes that she will be even more miserable if she fads to kill
the children, or she now believes that the children may be a source of cheer to her, and so
on), then the strength of his or her desire to perform that action changes, and he or she
will instead take an alternative course of action (provided that the desire to perform that
alternative is now the strongest); and, conversely, if the person’s desire to perform a
particular action changes, then his or her conception of the goodness of the action in
comparison with the alternatives must have changed.
If this account of the relation between desire, thought and action is correct, then
not only do we have a tidy explanation of why Medea vacillates back and forth between
alternatives (fresh considerations present themselves to her as she contemplates her
action, resulting in her changes of mind about which alternative is best), but we also get a
Socratic (if not Socrates’) reason for denying the possibility of akrasia:
(10) All wrong action-that is, all actions which yield less good (or
more bad) for the person than some available alternative actionmust be solely the result of some sort of m iscalculation, of which
alternative is really the best one for the person.32

Without a doubt, Socrates will have been attracted to the first passage from the Medea
because of the account of Medea’s immanent wrong action that it suggests, but then find
himself somewhat befuddled by the second, akratic passage. But if akrasia explains
Medea’s action, then her thought about her situation and the strength of the desire upon
which she acts have, as it were, come unstuck-if ever they were connected. Her desire to
kill the children must then vaiy independently (or, at least, somewhat independently) of
her beliefs about whether or not she will be able to live happily (or less miserably) after
having killed them -an astonishing psychological state of affairs from the Socratic point of
view. If some human actions are akratic, then the relationship between thought, desire
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and action must inevitably be a far more complicated affair than the Socratic explanation
makes it out to be.
However, with these Socratic presumptions (6-9) in place, let’s see what happens
when it is allowed that Dough’s rational facility is quite capable of determining for him
that this is to be tasted, and not that, if his epithumia is to be satisfied. In other words,
let’s allow that the epithumia mentioned in fine 33 of 1147a have its own practical
syllogism. The case that I wish to make on behalf of the Socratic here can be made clear
if we imagine the Socratic cross-examining the akrates about why he acted as he did, and
the akrates responding according to the information contained in his syllogism of appetite.
Here, again, is the Syllogism of Appetite:
Everything sweet is pleasant (and so should be tasted).
This is sweet.
: [Taste this.]

If the Socratic now asks Dough, “Why did you taste the fresh pastry?” Dough’s answer is,
“Because it is sweet.” While this response on Dough’s part is informative, the Socratic
who is still presuming that (6-9), and hence (10), are true need not yet be compelled into
believing that he is speaking with a genuine akrates. The very nature of the Socratic view
of desire and action has it that the person pursues sweetness (say) because he or she
thinks it the best of his or her present alternatives. So if the Socratic is to be convinced
that he is dealing with a genuine akrates, he or she will continue to press the issue. We
might imagine, then, the exchange continuing along the following lines: Socrates asks, “I
still don’t quite follow you. Dough. What difference does its sweetness make as to whether
or not it should be tasted?” Dough responds: “Well, everything sweet is pleasant, and
pleasant things should be tasted.” This exchange between them now exhausts the
information recorded in the Syllogism of Appetite. But, as before, the Socratic still need
not be compelled by Dough’s response. All th at Dough has done is to change the
description of the object of his desire from the sweet to the pleasant, so Socrates still has
no reason to suppose that Dough is pursuing the pleasant for any other reason than that
it is thought to be the best of his present open alternatives. Suppose, then, that Socrates
continues his questioning along the same lines as before. Socrates: “I’m starting to get a
better picture, Dough, as to why you tasted the fresh pastry. But I’m still a little foggy
about your explanation. Why should pleasant things be tasted?” How, now, is Dough to
answer? Some scholars have said that, as a simple m atter of fact, the akrates is simply
unable to justify him or her self any further. Typically, this view is presented as one
about how Aristotle’s conception of the appetitive practical syllogism simply works. Once
the universal premise is reached, the akrates is simply not able to justify his or her action
any farther.33 I find such a position on the matter uncompelling. To begin with, it begs
the crucial question: Why can’t the person answer any further?—what non-intellectual >
factor prevents the akrates from answering? In fact, when it is borne in mind that the
account of akrasia in question is aimed mostly at Socrates, such a response amounts to
little more than a refusal to do philosophy with Socrates since it seems only to declare the
question unanswerable by the akrates', and since it is reasonably clear that Aristotle
wishes to engage the Socratic philosophically, this seems to be an unflattering
interpretation of Aristotle’s account of akrasia. Moreover, the Socratic will be eager to
point out, the would-be akrates was perfectly able in his or her answering of questions up
to this point, so there is nothing wrong with his or her rational faculty. That is, Dough
gives evidence of having substituted this particular pastry for. sweets', amhpresumably,
sweets has been substituted for the pleasant tasting. So Dough has also done some sort of
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discriminating between alternatives to arrive at the beliefs th at Sweets are pleasant
tasting and that This is sweet. Are we to simply suppose, then, that Dough’s rational
abilities suddenly atrophy once the universal belief is reached? No, the Socratic need not
be compelled here--at least not without further argumentation. In fact, if Aristotle
thought this maneuver a sufficient means with which to deal with Socrates, then I can’t
see that he has much reason to treat Socrates’ rejection of akrasia as the source of the first
aporia for the common beliefs. Why use Socrates’ view as something of a test for the
viability of the common beliefs if, in the end, it is sufficient to merely declare that the
rational faculty upon which the Socratic view depends is ineffective at some apparently
arbitrary point in the akrates’ reasoning process? (Similarly, it should now be seen, the
Socratic will not be immediately put off by the view th at some goods are simply
incommensurable with one another without much more argument on behalf of the
incommensurabilist. How, Socrates might ask, are we to be sure that the state of mind
the person is in is best described as being pulled in two different directions by
incommensurable goods, rather than as mere ignorance [uncertainty, etc.] about how the
goods are to be rationally compared with one another?)34
Now, there are two answers to Socrates’ last question (“Why should pleasant
things be tasted?”) that Dough must not give to Socrates, namely,
(DE) "I don’t know why, or whether, pleasant things should be
tasted,”
and,
(PG) "Because what’s pleasant is what’s good (best for me in the
present circumstance).”
Dough must not Say (DK) because this may give Socrates just what he wants: a confession
of ignorance or uncertainty about the proposed action.
He must not say (PG) because this will only show that Dough wrongly thinks that
the pleasant is the good, and once more exhibits his ignorance about what’s best for
himself. In other words, (PG) simply transforms what was a syllogism of appetite into a
“good” syllogism—a syllogism which represents the person trying to get what is best for
him or her self. Then, the Socratic may well maintain that Aristotle’s passage on akrasia
really is like Euripides’ first passage in the Medea: Dough sees two alternatives open
before him, each with its share of goods (pleasures) and bads (pains), and determining
which of the two courses of action is the most pleasurable may be somewhat difficult
(resulting, perhaps, in a feeling of “inward struggle”); but, in any event. Dough is, like
Medea, merely indecisive and not akratic.
Perhaps some readers will object that my way of handling the inadequacy of (PG)
is a little facile for, after all, Aristotle may simply maintain that Dough’s thinking (PG) is
a m atter of habit because the person has, over time, come to (wrongly) identify the
(bodily) pleasant with the good. If so, then of course Dough’s saying (PG) is not the result
of ignorance so much as it is an acquired intellectual disability: His reasoning about
matters of the bodily pleasant has become somewhat “corrupted”. But this suggestion
will not do here. For the habit described--that of believing that the (bodily) pleasant is
the good—is the state Aristotle calls akolasia (“intemperance”), and this state, he
maintains, is quite distinct from akrasia. The akolastos decides to act on the bodily
pleasant because the good is thought to be the bodily pleasant... but the akrates does not
have this belief (1148al7-18; see also 1148a8-9)! In other words, the akolastos
(habitually) wrongly concludes that the bodily pleasant is the good, but the akrates draws
no such conclusion·, the akrates decides (prohairesis) whafs best, but does not act upon it.
I conclude, then, that, as against the Socratic, Aristotle will have created a great
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deal of philosophical trouble for himself to explain akrasia by, in part, making reference
to a second practical syllogism, this one in the charge of appetite. Similarly, then, I
conclude also that Aristotle will have had a difficult time in using the assumption (5) to
argue against Socrates (namely, that the person doesn’t need to be desiring the good in
order to use his or her rational faculty to act upon the desire that he or she has). (In fact,
I suppose that Aristotle will have agreed with Socrates that,
(5*) All practical reasoning is reasoning about satisfying a desire
for the good.3*)

I am now in a position to answer an objection that I raised earlier concerning
Socrates’ alleged fallacious identification of,
(P) reasoning about how to get what’s (merely bodily) pleasant for
oneself,

with,
(B) reasoning about how to get what’s best for oneself,

or, the apparently fallacious (3): “If, in addition to the good syllogism, there is also the
syllogism of appetite, then, when the Aristotelian akrates acts he or she is acting from a
(false) belief about what is best overall for him or her in the present circumstance.”
Now surely, Socrates does not believe th at what’s best for oneself ju st is
whatever^ (merely bodily) pleasant for oneself, so my argument here will not proceed by
way of defending Socrates in that way. Instead, I will begin by pointing out that, in the
context of the argument in which (3) was originally stated, the Socratic him or her self
says nothing about there being any desire for what’s merely bodily pleasant for the
person-ίΛαί point being part of the objection against the Socratic’s argument. The
Socratic3s point, made against the two-syllogisms approach, is only that,
(R) In reasoning about how to satisfy whatever desire it is that the
person has, the person must reason about how to get what’s best for
him or her self.

Then, of course, if we suppose, with the two-syllogisms account of akrasia, that,
(DP) Sometimes we desire to do only what’s bodily pleasant for us,
regardless of whether or not getting what’s merely bodily pleasant
is also good for us,

then, together with (R), we get the apparently implicit identification of (B) with (P). For
then, whenever we reason about how to satisfy one of the desires mentioned in (DP), we
must, by (R), be reasoning about how to get what’s best for ourselves. The point that I
am making, however, is that while Socrates endorses (R), he does not, as is pretty widely
agreed, endorse (DP).36 Of course, a discussion of all of the whys and wherefores of
Socrates’ endorsement of (R) and rejection of (DP) falls well outside the scope of this
paper. But, these matters taken as granted, we are in a position to see rather plainly why
the Socratic will not allow there to be a syllogism of appetite without careful and rigorous
argumentation on Aristotle’s part. Once it is granted that the syllogism of appetite
involyes-in fact, requires--the rational substitution of a particular this for the sort of
thing mentioned in the universal premise, the Socratic (who endorses [R] and is waiting
for an argument against it) may well press the “akrates” Dough for an answer to the
question about why the thing’s pleasantness is a reason for tasting. The person’s powers
of rational substitution function perfectly well in the remainder of the practical syllogism
(Dough’s explaining that the pastry’s sweetness is a reason for eating the pastry, and that
a sweet taste’s being pleasant is a reason for pursuing the sweet), so why should they
falter now? Is it because the sort of reasoning involved in justifying the universal premise
is of a relevantly different sort than what I have been referring to as the “substitution of a
particular thing for a somewhat general thing”? I fail to see how. From the Socratic point
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of view, after all (and that is the point of view that matters here), persons always want
what’s really best for themselves, so the belief that something pleasant should be tasted
must be the result of supposing (at least in the person’s present circumstance) that the
pleasant-tasting is the good. But what this reasoning involves is simply a rational
substitution of the term, the pleasant-tasting, for the term, whatever’s best (in the present
circumstance)! But this is precisely what occurs, I have maintained, in Aristotelian
practical syllogistic. In each case, the person must discriminate between his or her
available options, decide which of them best fits the bill, and then perform the
substitution of terms. This seems to be quite enough to make practical syllogistic a case of
“Socratic” substitution. I expect that Socrates would have said here:
“It seems that this fresh pastry is really only thought-good by Dough;
but this does not mean that he therefore doesn’t really desire only the
real good. Dough’s problem is clearly a misestimation of the goodness
to come from the action of eating the pastry, together w ith a
misestimation of the good to come from the action of not eating the
pastry. He is, like Medea in the first passage, only indecisive about
what’s really best for himself. A two-syllogisms approach to giving a
positive account of akrasia is wholly unsatisfactory as a refutation of
my rejection of akrasia.”

To sum up this portion of my discussion: from the point of view of the philosophical
exchange between Aristotle and Socrates on akrasia, there is nothing suspect, really,
about the Socratic’s premise (3) in the argument against the two-syllogisms approach. So
long as Dough is reasoning about how best to satisfy a desire (remember: Dough opts for
the pastry, and not the box in which it sits), he is reasoning about how to do what’s best
for himself--never mind what he says (cf. Medea’s declaration of akrasia in the second
passage)!
Another objection that will be made regarding my presentation of the practical
syllogism is that it simply does not involve reasoning, or at least, that it does not involve
the relevant sort of reasoning needed in order for me to treat it as being the Socratic sort
of rational mechanism that I have said it is. Instead, according to this view, the practical
syllogism is simply that device which non-rationally connects a person’s actual reasoning
about what to do with his or her action, via perception (or some other non-rational--that is,
non-substitutive—mechanism). The strongest account of this view is, in my estimation,
John Cooper’s (Reason and Human Good in Aristotle, Hackett, pp. 1-88).
What inspires Cooper’s view is Aristotle’s claim that all virtuous action is chosen
(prokairetike?7). According to Cooper, this claim of Aristotle’s, if taken quite literally,
implies that our “moral decisions” are all somewhat robustly thought out. In fact. Cooper
objects, if this is what Aristotle is saying, then our “moral decisions are much more
excogitated than in general they are” (p.7). But surely, we might insist, our judgments
about what we should do are not all th at consciously thought out-if they are really
thought out at all. Consider the following (“non-moral”) example of “extreme
excogitation” offered by Cooper (p. 26):
To see what I’m doing I need light; to get light I can turn on
the electric bulb; to turn on the electric bulb I need to turn
the switch to “on”; this is the switch—whereupon I decide to
turn this to “on,” and do so at once. Thus deliberation when
com plete yields an action, decided on as the action o f
turning this (pointing), or eating this , and so on, an action
described in such terms, being always calculated as the,, or a, ,
way of realizing one’s purpose.38

As I have maintained about Dough: he must somehow say to himself, “this is the sweet
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thing.”

But Cooper maintains instead that once it is decided that turning on a light is a way
of achieving one’s end (or, say, that eating sweets is a way of achieving one’s end), the
agent need do no further rational discriminating between possible objects of action. The
person doesn’t need to deliberate about what thing is the light switch (or the pastry), for
he or she already knows this-he just reaches out and turns the switch to “on.” So when it
comes to actually turning the switch, Cooper argues (p. 27) “It is perception that is called
for . . . not further reflection.” It is not surprising, then, Cooper thinks, that Aristotle
should characterize the particular premise of a practical syllogism as being “controlled
by” perception (VII.3.1147a27, blO). Perhaps action is really only relatively prohairetike.
The main difficulty with Cooper’s argument about over-excogitation, or so I shall
maintain, is that it fails to adequately explain how the person, non-rationally, actually
mariages to turn the individual switch to ‘on,’ rather than perform some other action which
does not have the effect of satisfying his desire for light. Let us assume that the person
has now reached what we have been referring to as the universal premise in a practical
syllogism (that, say, In all these sorts of circumstances, it is good to have light)—that point
which Cooper thinks is the last thing that is deliberated, and which constitutes the
prohairesis. How, precisely, are we to now explain the person’s actually reaching for and
turning on the light switch? Cooper’s answer here is that the person need only perceive
the light switch. But surely the person has a number of other perceptions at the same
time as he or she perceives the light switch (e.g., perceptions of a faucet knob and a
garbage disposal switch). So we may now ask (in perfectly Socratic fashion, I think) how
does the person know upon which perception to act if, as Cooper has it, there is no rational
means needed to perform the discrimination between perceptions (two perceptions of
which, by the way, are frustratingly similar to one another)? How is our person to ensure
that his or her dumb, non-rational perception of light switch rather than his or her
perception of garbage disposal switch, or even faucet knob, “connects” with the universal
belief about its being good to have light? If Dough perceives the pastry box in addition to
the fresh pastries, how is it that these non-rational perceptions manage, by themselves, to
have only the one and not the other of them connect with the universal belief in order to
cause the action which leads to the satisfaction of the desire for sweet? I do not see how
this can be,39 but for some discriminatory mechanism which is able to select the one as
being the correct, or the better, perception upon which to act. Cooper thinks the question
is one of whether or not one might already know what a light switch is or looks like (as
though one perceives light switches in isolation from anything else), prior to turning it on.
I think this question is mostly beside the point, for the issue involved is one of how the
person identifies which of his or her perceptions is the light switch perception-the
perception needed in order to satisfy the desire for light.
I suggest, instead, that there must-even in these cases of seemingly “automatic”
actiofi—be at work some sort of substitution principle which allows the person to
discriminate between his or her various perceptions, so as to be able to pick out which
perception (or perceptions) is (or so the person believes) relevant to the universal belief.
On my view, when I act upon a light switch perception, I have discriminated between it
and my other perceptions. The ideal candidate for such a principle is precisely some sort
of Socratically rational principle, for what is needed is some means of determining that
action upon this particular object is what the universal premise of the syllogism is calling
for: The person does not turn the switch tu^oh simply for the su^e of turmng the switch to
‘on,’ after all, but does so in order to achieve a certain end.
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Another way to look at my objection to Cooper’s view is invited by his suggestion
that complete deliberation may take place well before any practical syllogism links it to
action. If he is right, then it seems that the agent may “store up” several standing
prohaireseis, each waiting to be acted upon when its appropriate perception takes place.
By now, though, it should be clear th at the person will require the services of some
rational principle in order to successfully discharge any one of his or her standing
prohaireseis. If not, how else will the right individual perception get hooked up with its
corresponding prohairesis (again, conceived of here in the manner of a universal
premise)? If it does not correctly get hooked up, I suggest, the reason is simply because
the person has made some sort of error in his or her judgement about what’s best in the
present circumstance-about what perception goes with what “prohairesis.” (We may
imagine here the prospective home buyer testing the light switches, but rather than
turning on the kitchen light instead activates the garbage disposal. If Cooper’s position is
correct, I see no reason why this person won’t simply make the same mistake over and
over again: In all such situations as these which require a major economic commitment,
test the product carefully, including a testing of the circuitry by turning on a light switch,
says his “prohairesisH ere's a light switch, says non-rational perception; the person
[repeatedly] turns on the garbage disposal just so long as it is the garbage disposal switch
which is repeatedly perceived.)
When it is recalled, now, that Aristotle’s aim in VII.3 is, in part, to respond to
Socrates with a positive account of akrasia, and it is also recalled that a Euripidean
juxtaposition of explanations of wrong action allows the Socratic a far too ready reply to
him -”Bzii the person is still acting from a rational desirer~vre should be highly dubious
of an interpretation of Aristotle that has him explaining akrasia by making use of two
practical syllogisms. A more promising reply to Socrates would be one in which akratic
action is not rational at all (in the sense of involving substitution). I believe the relevant
passages of the Ethics allows for such an alternative interpretation of Aristotle.
§5. Concluding Remarks.
There are at least two veiy pressing questions I have yet to answer, each of which
must be left unattended. First: If Aristotle does not explain akrasia by the use of two
practical syllogisms, then how else is the passage at 1147a31-5 (which seems to make
such clear mention of two universal premises) to be read? Second: How does Aristotle’s
account of akrasia really go? Below I offer only my own quick answers to each question,
foregoing here arguments and explanations for either of them.
Aristotle’s account of akrasia, I believe, must rely upon epithumia being much like
Plato’s species of irrational desire (Republic, IV, 435b, ff.) of the same name, which is
“housed” in its own part of the soul--cut off from any use of a rational faculty to get itself
acted upon. So Aristotle (and Plato) must provide a non-rational mechanism which gets
the person to act upon the epithumia. As I stated at the outset: For Aristotle, akratic
action is not rational at all (in the sense of involving substitution).
As for how to read the main passage discussed here (EN, 1147a31-35), I believe
that a more thorough examination of Aristotelian practical syllogistic will show the
troubling remark, “Everything sweet is pleasant and this is sweet,” to involve mention of
only a particular prem ise-not a particular and (a second) universal. If so, then the
textual evidence supporting a two-syllogisms account is considerably weakened.
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